NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 16
Issue 5 Online Issue

Article 6

4-1-2015

Railing Against Cyber Imperialism: Discussing the
Issues Surrounding the Pending Appeal of United
States v. Microsoft Corp.
Jason Green

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Recommended Citation
Jason Green, Railing Against Cyber Imperialism: Discussing the Issues Surrounding the Pending Appeal of United States v. Microsoft Corp., 16
N.C. J.L. & Tech. 172 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol16/iss5/6

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172 (2015)
RAILING AGAINST CYBER IMPERIALISM:
DISCUSSING THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PENDING APPEAL OF
UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT CORP.
Jason Young Green*
The United States government was granted a wide berth of
surveillance powers post 9/11. At a time when Americans felt
vulnerable to foreign attack, the executive branch passed the USA
PATRIOT Act that balanced a reduction of privacy rights with a
promise of increased national security. Twelve years later, Edward
Snowden released documents showing exactly how pervasive U.S.
intelligence gathering had become. Now, in a post-Snowden world,
Americans are struggling to balance privacy rights with national
security and effective law enforcement. The recent appeal of the
Microsoft Corporation, which involves a warrant for the
extraterritorial information of a foreign subject, highlights this
struggle and brings it into the spotlight. This Recent Development
argues that such extraterritorial warrants are beyond the powers
of the executive branch, and need to be tempered by judicial, if not
congressional, review. Further, the United States bypassing
established treaties and the privacy laws of those nations in order
to obtain this information could be seen as aggression against
foreign nations. This Article further explores and recommends
legal reforms that better accommodate the international nature of
the internet and the laws of sovereign nations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The privacy debate is reaching critical mass in the United
States as foreign and domestic policy makers attempt to make
sense of a post-Snowden world. In the summer of 2013, Edward
*
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Snowden, a former National Security Agency (“NSA”) systems
administrator, shocked the world with the revelation that Big
Brother1 really was watching.2 The documents he released revealed
that the United States government was not only spying on
foreigners, but also on its own citizens.3 In the fervor that followed
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the government granted
sweeping powers to its intelligence agencies in its War on Terror.
When Snowden blew the whistle on the breadth of the NSA’s
spying—such as bullying tech giants Verizon, Sprint, and Google
into handing over customer information—it became clear that the
government had overstepped its bounds.4 Since the first Snowden
release, the media has been inundated with stories of privacy
breaches and hacks.
Tech firms are now fighting back. In what should prove to be a
landmark decision for international and privacy law, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is currently
weighing whether information stored by a United States company
on foreign servers can bypass international laws and treaties and be
recovered under a search and seizure warrant.5 In December 2013,
a U.S. magistrate judge issued a search warrant on the Microsoft
Corporation (“Microsoft”), demanding access to emails stored on a
server in Dublin, Ireland.6 The United States District Court for the
1

“Big Brother” alludes to George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984. The novel
is set in world of perpetual war, omnipresent government surveillance, and
public manipulation. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic
1950).
2
Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He Leaked
Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html.
3
Id.
4
See Evan Perez, Telecom Firm Pushed Back on NSA Data Collection,
Papers Show, CNN (May 15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/14/us/nsaphone-data-telecoms/; see also Shane Harris, Google’s Secret NSA Alliance: The
Terrifying Deals Between Silicon Valley and the Security State, SALON (Nov.
16, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/16/googles_secret_nsa_alliance_the_
terrifying_deals_between_silicon_valley_and_the_security_state/.
5
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
6
Id.
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Southern District of New York agreed with the magistrate judge’s
grounds to issue the warrant.7 However, Microsoft was allowed to
appeal to the Second Circuit.8 Now the world waits for a decision
that will change the way nations regard the United States and its
privacy policies, as this is the first case in which an international
corporation has challenged a United States search warrant seeking
data held abroad.9
The ramifications of this decision will be of a global scale, with
far-reaching implications for the privacy rights of the citizens of
every nation as well as the American companies that collect their
private data.10 Major international technology companies eagerly
anticipate the Second Circuit’s decision.11 Regardless of whether
7

In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 29,
2014).
8
Brief for Appellant at 2, Microsoft v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (2nd
Cir. 2014).
9
Joseph Ax, U.S. Judge Orders Microsoft to Submit Customer’s Emails from
Abroad, REUTERS (July 31, 2014, 4:25PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/07/31/usa-tech-warrants-idUSL2N0Q61WN20140731.
10
See generally Katrina vanden Heuvel & Stephen F. Cohen, Edward Snowden:
A ‘Nation’ Interview, THE NATION (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/
article/186129/snowden-exile-exclusive-interview (during the interview, Snowden
discusses the actions countries are already taking, such as Russia’s new privacy
regime, and how a ruling in the government’s favor in the present case would
encourage other countries to seek similar data localization laws. These efforts
will be explained further in Part II and III); see also Kate Westmoreland, Whose
Laws Control your Data? The Implications of the Microsoft Search Warrant
Challenge, STANFORD L. SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y BLOG (June 23,
2014), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/06/whose-laws-control-your-dataimplications-microsoft-search-warrant-challenge.
11
The overwhelming support Microsoft has received from its peers and
competitors is telling. See Brad Smith, Business, Media and Civil Society Speak
Up in Key Privacy Case, THE OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/12/15/business-media-civil-society-speakkey-privacy-case/ (discussing the ten amici briefs submitted by: twenty-eight
Tech and Media companies, thirty-five leading computer scientists, and
twenty-three trade associations and advocacy groups on Microsoft’s behalf). The
companies represented include Verizon, Apple, Amazon, Cisco, Salesforce, HP,
eBay, Infor, AT&T, and Rackspace. Id. They also include business
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National
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the decision survives the appeals process, the most important
aspect of this case is what it reveals about the interaction between
United States privacy laws, international treaties, and the
Electronic Communications Protection Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).12
This decision should inspire the judiciary to rein in overbroad
executive power and prompt Congress to legislate this matter
properly.13
If the United States gets a favorable verdict, the judiciary will
be approving the executive branch’s continued expansion of
power; if Microsoft wins, the judiciary will be exercising its
hallmark right of judicial review, and reinforcing the checks and
balances that are built into the United States Constitution.
This Recent Development argues for congressional and judicial
oversight with respect to prevailing U.S. executive branch attitudes
towards foreign and domestic privacy affairs. Specifically, the
Executive has bypassed the review process by the loose use of
warrants issued under the ECPA and the violation of fundamental
privacy principles that both the United States and European Union
(“EU”) adhere to in their unique approaches to privacy policy. Part
II begins with a survey of the development of EU and U.S. privacy
policy, both before Snowden’s revelations and after. Part III will
use that backdrop to frame the privacy issues the Second Circuit
faces in United States v. Microsoft Corp. Part IV analyzes the
Association of Manufacturers; civil liberties organizations such as the Center for
Democracy & Technology, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law, and the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard;
major media companies such as CNN, ABC, Fox News, Forbes, the Guardian,
Gannett, McClatchy, the Washington Post, the New York Daily News, and the
Seattle Times. Id. For a complete list, visit http://mscorp.blob.core.windows.net/
mscorpmedia/2014/12/Amicus-Briefing-Filers_Supporters2.pdf.
12
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq.
13
Orin Kerr, a computer crime law professor at the George Washington School
of Law, discusses his suggestions for Congress in a Volokh Conspiracy blog post.
See generally Orin Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside
the U.S.? VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mailstored-outside-the-u-s/.
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ramifications of a decision for each party with discussion of
international response.
II. WHAT A DIFFERENCE A FEW YEARS MAKES: THE 2012–2014
LANDSCAPE OF EU AND U.S. PRIVACY LAWS
Before delving into the intricacies of the Microsoft14 case, it is
important to understand the state of privacy relations between the
United States and the EU before and after Snowden began leaking
classified NSA documents. First, this section examines EU and
U.S. privacy policies that were in place in 2012, the year before
Snowden began his progressive leak. Second, it will briefly discuss
what Snowden did in 2013. Lastly, this section reviews the
changes to EU and U.S. policy post-Snowden. This overview of
privacy policy provides the background necessary to discuss the
consequences that the Second Circuit must confront in the
Microsoft decision.
A. 2012: EU/U.S. Privacy Pre-Snowden
Privacy law and the belief that there is a fundamental right to
privacy is a legal idea that has been percolating for little more than
a century, with most discussions starting with the 1890 Warren and
Brandeis piece The Right to Privacy published in the Harvard Law
Review.15 Advocating for the “right to be let alone” in the context
of invasive high society articles in the newspapers, the two authors
started a national and international discussion of whether there is a
fundamental right to privacy.16
Fast forwarding to 1980, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) issued its privacy
guidelines based primarily on the Fair Information Practice
Principles (“FIPPs”), which are focused on empowering people to
control their personal information and safeguards to ensure

14

Brief for Appellant, supra note 8.
4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
16
Id. at 195.
15
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adequate data security.17 The five FIPPs are: (1) notice/awareness,
(2) choice/consent, (3) access/participation, (4) integrity/security,
and (5) enforcement.18 The OECD report became the basis for
modern U.S. and EU privacy law; interestingly, both entities took
diverging views implementing the FIPPs.19
In the United States, where privacy concerns are counterbalanced
by First Amendment rights of free expression, a “sectoral”
approach to privacy developed.20 The sectoral model does not have
one overarching privacy law, but rather it regulates citizen privacy
with sector-specific21 laws. Some of these sector-specific laws
include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),22 which protects
17

OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe
protectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm, (last visited Feb.
27, 2015).
18
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS,
1, 7–11 (June 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. The five basic FIPPS were
defined as: (1) notice and awareness: “[c]onsumers should be given notice of an
organization’s information practices before any personal information is collected
from them;” (2) choice and consent: consumers should have options to control
how their data is used; (3) access and participation: “. . . an individual’s ability
both to access data about him or herself . . . and to contest that data’s accuracy
and completeness,” (4) integrity and security: organizations that collect data
should ensure that the collected data is accurate and secure; and (5) enforcement
and redress: enforcement measures, such as regulatory oversight with civil
and/or criminal penalties for noncompliance, should be implemented to ensure
that organizations follow the FIPPs. Id.
19
Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, So Close, Yet So Far Apart: The EU
and U.S. Visions of a New Privacy Framework, 26 ANTITRUST 8, 9–10 (summer
2012).
20
Natasha Singer, Data Privacy Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumerdata-protection-laws-an-ocean-apart.html?_r=0.
21
The sectoral approach simply refers to certain industries being regulated
(Healthcare), and certain individuals being regulated (children on the internet),
while other industries or individuals are left to their own devices. See Robert
Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: the Safe Harbor Agreement and Its
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777,
2779 (2002).
22
15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.; 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 et seq.; 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 et seq.

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 178
Railing Against Cyber Imperialism
a person’s privacy interests held by financial institutions, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),23
which protects private health information, and the Child Online
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”)24, which protects the personal
information of children under the age of thirteen. The majority of
these Acts do not provide private rights of action for citizens when
their private data has been breached.25
The prevailing feature of United States privacy law is
accountability: with few statutes allowing for a private right of
action, U.S. citizens depend on the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) to prosecute privacy violations. In addition to the
sector-specific laws, the FTC has created standards for how
businesses may collect, use, and protect the personal information
of their clients.26 The FTC regulates privacy by taking action
against businesses for “unfair or deceptive” practices.27 Some
examples of the FTC’s earliest actions include those against Eli
Lilly,28 Microsoft,29 and Gateway Learning.30 In addition, in 2011,
the FTC filed actions against tech giants Google and Facebook.31
Both companies settled and adopted comprehensive privacy
programs patterned on the FIPPs.32 These outcomes, at the time,
were seen as wins—positive signs that the privacy regime in the
United States was improving; the FTC was heralded as having a
23

Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506.
25
See id.; Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
26
Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19, at 9.
27
15 U.S.C. 45(a).
28
In re Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763 (2002).
29
See Microsoft Corp., FTC File No. 012-3240 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3047/gateway-learning-corp-matter.
30
See Gateway Learning Corp., FTC File No. 042-3047 (2004), https://www.
ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/042-3047/gateway-learning-corp-matter.
31
See Google, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3136 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3136/google-inc-matter; Facebook, Inc., FTC
File No. 092-3184 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
092-3184/facebook-inc.
32
See Google, Inc., supra note 31; Facebook, Inc., supra note 31; see also
Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19.
24
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“major role in preventing violations of consumers’ expectations of
privacy in the United States.”33
On the other side of the Atlantic, the EU enacted a
comprehensive Directive that regulates every piece of personal
information and establishes privacy as a fundamental human
right.34 This across-the-board privacy regime gives each EU citizen
a right of action should their rights be violated. So zealously does
the EU guard its citizens’ privacy rights that lawsuits that would be
standard in the United States end with seemingly bizarre results in
Europe. For example, in Italy, three Google executives were
convicted of invasion of privacy for failing to block a YouTube
video of a group of students bullying a disabled classmate.35
Perhaps the most succinct difference between EU and U.S.
privacy policy is the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”)
declaration that EU citizens have a “right to be forgotten,”36 a
sentiment that would seem strange to most Americans.37 The case
was filed in 2010, when a Spanish plaintiff complained to Google
Spain, Google Inc., and a Spanish newspaper that notice of the
plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s Spanish search engine
infringed his right to privacy.38 The plaintiff’s argument before the
33

Wolf & Maxwell, supra note 19, at 9.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
(1995), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.
35
Kit Eaton, Italy Convicts Google Execs on Privacy Invasion Charges, Revisits
Dark Ages, FAST CO. (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:55AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1560995/italy-convicts-google-execs-privacy-invasion-charges-revisits-dark-ages.
36
See Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola De Proteccion de Datos, infra note 38.
37
California has enacted a limited form of this effective January 2015, called
the Children’s Right to be Forgotten Act, dealing primarily with access to
information about a person prior to their 18th birthday (social media, etc). S.B.
568, 2013-14 Sess., (Ca. 2013).
38
Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola De Proteccion de Datos,
2013 CURIA (June 25, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dda9fa02f973a74005a72486437479f81b.e34KaxiLc3
qMb40Rch0SaxuPb3n0?text=&docid=138782&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=416611. In its decision, the ECJ held that
34
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ECJ was that he, as a realtor, had the right to have the information
removed because the incident had been fully addressed years
before, and the information posted harmed his business.39 The ECJ
granted the plaintiff’s request that the newspaper be required to
remove or alter the pages in question and that Google Spain or
Google Inc. be required to remove the information from the
internet.40
Furthermore, the EU so vigorously protects the privacy of its
citizens that before any data containing personal information about
an EU citizen is sent overseas, the receiving country’s privacy
policies must be reviewed and approved by the EU Commission.41
The EU has deemed U.S. privacy policies as being inadequate.42
As such, companies in the United States that wish to receive and
process data about European customers must implement and
adhere to strict rules that follow EU privacy guidelines.43

an Internet search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it carries
out of personal information that appears on web pages published by third
parties. The outcome of the ruling is that an Internet search engine must consider
requests from individuals to remove links to freely accessible web pages
resulting from a search on their name. Grounds for removal include cases where
the search result(s) appear to be inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive in the light
of the time that had elapsed. If the search engine rejects the request, the
individual may ask relevant authorities to consider the case. Under certain
conditions, the search engine may be ordered to remove the links from search
results.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
(1995), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML; Frequently Asked Questions Related to Transfers
of Personal Data from the EU?EEA to Third Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/policies/privacy/docs/international_transfers_faq/international_transfers_
faq.pdf
42
Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, http://
export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2015, 11:47 AM).
43
Binding Corporate Rules (“BCRs”), utilization of Model Contracts set forth
by the EU, or participation in the EU-US Safe Harbor program are currently the
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Despite this U.S. sectoral approach versus the EU’s
comprehensive approach to privacy, efforts were underway in
2012 to harmonize existing laws and to set a global standard for
protection. United States officials even conjectured that the
divergent approaches were at least equal, with the “sum of the
parts of U.S. privacy protection [being] equal to or greater than the
single whole of Europe.”44 In 2012, President Obama submitted a
proposed Consumer Bill of Rights, which would move U.S.
privacy policies more in line with those of the EU.45 It appeared
that a golden age of global privacy was being ushered in.
B. 2013: The Snowden Event
Before June 5, 2013, the world did not know the name Edward
Snowden. On June 5, he released the first wave of documents he
had obtained while working as a high-ranking systems
administrator for the NSA.46 Overnight, he became famous: the
world obsessed over the revelation that the U.S. government had
ordered telecommunications giant Verizon to hand over data under
the USA PATRIOT Act.47 On the following day, more classified
documents that Snowden had collected were released, unveiling
the NSA’s PRISM program whereby the government had access to
voicemails, emails, texts, photos, videos, and files from the biggest
tech firms in the United States.48

only ways in which U.S. companies are allowed to handle the personal data of
EU citizens.
44
See Singer, supra note 20 (quoting Cameron Kerry, General Counsel for the
U.S. Department of Commerce).
45
Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (Feb. 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
46
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
47
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
48
Id.
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As the months rolled by, Snowden slowly released more
documents revealing the breadth of U.S. surveillance, both
domestically and abroad.49 The world reeled with the revelation
that the NSA operated with a “collect it all” mentality.50 The
method was developed in 2005 by the then newly appointed NSA
director, General Keith B. Alexander, as a means to mitigate U.S.
troop loss from improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”).51 The plan,
Real Time Regional Gateway, which collected every Iraqi text
message, phone call, and e-mail, played a role in breaking up Iraqi
insurgent networks and significantly reduced the IED death toll by
late 2008.52 Alexander’s driving goal, spurred by the lack of
intelligence that preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,

49

See Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy
on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/
nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?_r=0; see also Barton Gellman &
Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collections Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5
be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html; James Ball, et al., Revealed: How
US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchqencryption-codes-security.
50
Glenn Greenwald, The Crux of the NSA Story in One Phrase: Collect it All,
THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/jul/15/crux-nsa-collect-it-all; Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, For NSA
Cheif, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to ‘Collect it All,’ WASH. POST (July 14,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-nsa-chiefterrorist-threat-drives-passion-to-collect-it-all/2013/07/14/3d26ef80-ea49-11e2a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html. (“[N]ew details of the spy agency’s vast reach
were brought to light last month by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden,
. . . who leaked classified information on government programs that sweep up
‘metadata’ on phone calls and e-mails by Americans. Those revelations in turn
have spotlighted the role played by Alexander, the NSA’s avuncular leader and,
by all accounts, a driving force behind a post-Sept. 11, 2001, quest to transform
an agency inundated by the data revolution into one that can exploit it to defend
the nation.”).
51
Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 50.
52
Id.
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was to transform the NSA from “an agency inundated by the data
revolution into one that can exploit it to defend the nation.”53
Privacy rights of the individual are constantly at war with
effective law enforcement principles. Alexander, as head of the
NSA, was entrusted with the duty to protect the United States from
terrorist threats both at home and abroad. The steps that he took to
analyze and act on data that he collected that led to the reduction of
U.S. soldier deaths are noteworthy.54 However, the government did
not fail in its mission to “collect it all” in its execution, but in its
oversight.55 Gen. Alexander frequently points out that the NSA
collection programs are subject to oversight by Congress as well as
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.56 However, the
proceedings of these two bodies are secret.57 This lack of
transparent oversight has given the NSA a wide berth in its
operations, in violation of the FIPPS that both EU and U.S. privacy
frameworks are based on, specifically the fundamentals of Notice
and Consent.58 By having secret FISA court orders and ECPA
warrants that are rarely, if ever, unsealed, citizens targeted by NSA
are never notified of the invasion of their privacy, and thus have no
control over it.59 It is this lack of oversight that has allowed the NSA
collection mechanism to run rampant and is precisely what must be
addressed.

53

Id.
Id.
55
Charlie Savage & Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending
U.S. Spies’ Reach, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/12/us/how-a-courts-secret-evolution-extended-spies-reach.html.
56
Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 50.
57
ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 3 (2015), available at https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/What_Went_%20Wrong_With_
The_FISA_Court.pdf.
58
Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming the ECPA’s
Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 601, 615 (2012).
59
Id.
54
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C. 2014 and Beyond: EU/US Privacy Post-Snowden
The White House has moved slowly in reforming the NSA and
U.S. spy policies, reportedly maintaining that the system was legal,
but needs to be changed in order to “reassure a skeptical public.”60
Proposals have been met with resistance, however, as the makeup
of Congress has shifted to become Republican-dominated and
political pressure from outside threats, such as the Paris terrorist
attacks, keep the world on edge.61 U.S. tech companies have lost
significant business and are concerned the impact of the Snowden
revelations will continue to hurt their bottom lines.62 Foreign
governments are instituting new policies that seek alternatives to
American technology for fear of NSA spying. In March 2014, the
European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and
Directive, imposing strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’
data.63 This law requires that anyone handling the data of European
60

Tom Cohen, et al, Obama, Congress Working on Changes to NSA, CNN
(Mar. 25, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/25/politics/white-house-nsa/;
see also Julian Hattem, NSA Reform Facing Hard Sell Following Paris Terror
Attacks, THE HILL (Jan. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/
229096-nsa-reform-faces-hard-sell-after-paris-attack. (Noting that reforms proposed
by President Obama in January of 2014, which called for the end of the NSA’s
mass collection of metadata, failed in the Senate by two votes).
61
Ellen Nakashima & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Fails to Advance Legislation on NSA
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/senate-fails-to-advance-legislation-on-nsa-reform/2014/11/18/
a72eb7fc-6f70-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html; Hattem supra note 60
(“‘That metadata doesn’t look all that scary this morning,’ former NSA head
Michael Hayden said on MSNBC after Wednesday’s shooting [in Paris], the worst
act of Terror France has seen in generations.”).
62
Laura Donohue, High Technology, Consumer Privacy, and U.S. National
Security, BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (citing Michael Hickens, Spying Fears
Abroad Hurt U.S. Tech Firms, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303743604579350611848246016) (“The Information
Technology and Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard
the growth of the technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S.
companies’ ability to expand and forcing them out of existing markets.”).
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Id. European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation
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citizens “must obtain the consent of the data subjects to having
their personal information processed,” and further requires that the
citizens retain a right to later withdraw this consent.64 Too, the
Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament recently passed a resolution that calls for the
end of the U.S./EU Safe Harbor program.65
Other nations around the world are also altering how they treat
cloud data and how they interact with the United States. Russia
passed a law that requires foreign Internet companies to store
Russian users’ personal data within Russian borders to prevent
tampering by the United States.66 Brazil passed a new law that
prohibits the disclosure, absent a Brazilian court order, of
communications stored, collected, or processed in Brazil or for
communications in which one party is in Brazil.67 The Chinese are
even ripping American technology out of their systems for fear of
NSA spying or circumstances similar to the present issue in
Ireland.68
The Snowden revelations made privacy an international
concern. From its humble beginnings in the Warren and Brandeis
piece in 1890 to today’s constant stream of corporate and
government intrusion, the feeling that there is some fundamental
right to be protected has grown exponentially. The cause of this
(Com(2012)0011 — C7-0025/2012 — 2012/0011(COD)), available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0212+
0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
64
Donohue, supra note 62.
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Paul Sonne & Olga Razumovskaya, Russia Steps Up New Law to Control
Foreign Internet Companies, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/russia-steps-up-new-law-to-control-foreign-internet-companies-1411574920.
67
See Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil da
Internet), Law No. 12.965 (Apr. 23, 2014) (Braz.). Unofficial English translation,
available at https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/documents/
APPROVED-MARCO-CIVIL-MAY-2014.pdf.
68
China is Planning to Purge Foreign Technology and Replace With Homegrown
Suppliers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-12-17/china-said-to-plan-sweeping-shift-from-foreign-technology-toown.html.
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exponential-explosion is the pervasive nature of the modern
Internet. The Warren and Brandeis “right to be let alone” at social
events has evolved into the European Court of Justice’s declaration
that E.U. citizens have a “right to be forgotten” by search engines.
This radical leap has been greatly influenced by the advent of the
Internet. The Internet is pervasive in today’s business and society,
and the implications of data farms and cloud computing complicate
privacy regimes that differ from state to state, and nation to nation.
III. UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT, CORP. IN THE
POST-SNOWDEN WORLD
On December 4, 2013, a magistrate in the Southern District of
New York issued a warrant that directed Microsoft to produce
content and non-content information about a user whose account is
associated with its Dublin, Ireland datacenter.69 Microsoft’s
wholly-owned subsidiary, Microsoft Ireland Operations, Ltd.,
leases and operates the datacenter.70 Microsoft began storing email
data there in September 2010.71 Microsoft stores users’ email
information at datacenters around the world and assigns users to
different datacenters according to proximity in order to increase
communications quality and decrease network latency.72 When a
user signs up for email service, he or she is prompted to enter a
country code that Microsoft uses to decide where to locate the
user’s data.73 Microsoft maintains non-content metadata associated
with the account in the US.
The warrant was issued under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.74 Rule 41 is silent as to whether it has
69

Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Microsoft’s Motion
to Vacate Email Account Warrant, Exhibit A, In re Warrant to Search a Certain
E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 13 Mag 2814
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), available at http://digitalconstitution.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/government-warrant.pdf.
70
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
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extraterritorial effect.75 Microsoft produced the non-content data
stored in the United States but objected to producing the content
information stored in the Ireland datacenter.76 On December 18,
2013, Microsoft moved to vacate the warrant for that content.77 The
magistrate judge rejected Microsoft’s motion to vacate.78
On July 31, 2014, the Southern District of New York upheld
the magistrate judge on appeal.79 It upheld the extraterritorial
execution of the warrant and held Microsoft in contempt for
refusing to comply.80 The Southern District of New York ruled that
when Congress used the term “warrant,” it actually meant a
“hybrid” subpoena, indistinguishable from the type that can
compel a bank to produce its own transaction records from a
foreign branch.81 It concluded that, so long as no federal agents go
on Irish soil, no impermissible extraterritorial action occurs.82
Microsoft argues that the courts presume that federal statutes
do not apply extraterritorially unless Congress expresses a clear
intent for them to do so.83 It also contends that Congress did not
indicate in the ECPA that Congress intended to authorize federal
and local police to commandeer service providers to execute
searches and seizures of private emails located in foreign
countries.84 In addition, Microsoft’s brief argues that Congress did
not express any intention to permit the U.S. government to ignore
75

Id.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y 2014)..
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Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV, 2014 WL 4629624, at *1
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established avenues for international cooperation, such as Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties, to obtain such evidence.85 The question
on appeal, Microsoft states, is whether US law enforcement may
nevertheless invoke ECPA to conscript providers to search and
seize private emails in a foreign country.86
The U.S. government filed its response on March 9, 2015.87 It
continues to applaud Magistrate Judge Francis’ conclusion that
nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the SCA
indicated that “Congress intended to limit the ability of law
enforcement agents to obtain account information from domestic
service providers who happen to store that information overseas.”88
The U.S. government’s chief argument echoes that of Judge
Francis, stating that the “purpose of the SCA demonstrates that the
imposition of a warrant requirement has nothing to do with the
physical location of the relevant records.”89
Thus a central issue in the Second Circuit’s deliberation of
Microsoft is that of location: the U.S. government wants to obtain,
through Microsoft, a subject’s personal information that is located
in the EU member country of Ireland.90 In its appeal to the Second
Circuit, Microsoft argues, along with numerous amici, that the U.S.
government has placed the company between the proverbial rock
and a hard place.91 Their options are either to respect Irish laws and
85
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Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F.
Supp. 3d at 471.
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Brief for Appellant, supra note 8 at 2.
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See id. at 2–4; Brief for Verizon Comm. Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 1–3, Microsoft v. United States, 2014 WL 7213175 2d
Cir.) (2014) (No. 14-2985-cv) (“Moreover, because they operate in multiple
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violate the court order (and suffer resulting sanctions from the U.S.
government), or to violate both Irish laws and international treaties
in order to comply with the U.S. court order.
Before discussing how a verdict in either direction will affect
EU/U.S. privacy concerns, especially in the realm of U.S. tech
companies, this Recent Development provides an overview of the
technology involved. Microsoft stores its emails in the cloud, and
alleges that the data the US seeks is physically located on a server
in an Irish data center.92 Is information stored in the cloud really
located in any one specific, physical location if it can be accessed
from anywhere? While the U.S. government seems to think not,
the private sector overwhelmingly agrees that it is.93
A. The “Cloud:” What it is Exactly, and its Implications in the
Microsoft Case
As the Center for Democracy and Technology succinctly points
out, the “animating question in this case is whether a U.S. law
enforcement agency can compel a U.S. provider of
communications service to disclose the content of digital
information the provider stores outside of the U.S.”94 The Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”),95 part of the ECPA, does not
address this specific issue of cloud-based data storage. The SCA
authorizes the government to seek the contents of stored
communications that are more than 180 days old; using a
companies like the amici to choose between complying with a U. S. search
warrant and violating foreign law, on the one hand, or complying with foreign
law and disobeying a U. S. court order, on the other.”).
92
Brief for Appellant, supra note 8.
93
Brief for Computer and Data Science Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985, (2d Cir. Dec. 15,
2014) (“while ‘the cloud’ has become a widely-used buzzword in recent years,
many people have little idea what it is or how it works,” said Philip Warrick of
Klarquist Sparkman LLP).
94
Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel A US Provider to
Disclose Data Stored Abroad?, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY
(July 30, 2014), https://cdt.org/insight/microsoft-ireland-case-can-a-us-warrantcompel-a-us-provider-to-disclose-data-stored-abroad/.
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subpoena, a warrant, or a court order issued under U.S.C.
§ 2703(d).96 However, the SCA is silent on whether it is supposed
to apply only domestically, or whether it applies to data stored
overseas as well.97 Thus, of central importance is determining
whether the data the US government seeks is located domestically
or abroad, and if abroad, whether Congress intended the SCA to
apply.
Determining just where particular bits of information are stored
at any one time in the cloud can be a confusing concept to grasp.
The U.S. government argues that due to the nebulous nature of
Microsoft’s cloud, paired with Microsoft’s status as a United States
corporation, Microsoft has no need to consult Ireland about the
emails stored in its servers there.98 Microsoft and its amici contend
that while the cloud seems nebulous, individual files are stored on
specific servers in specific locations.99
The cloud can be a funny thing. During a 2014 Super Bowl
commercial, comedian Amy Poehler campily runs through a Best
Buy electronic retail store asking employees, “What’s the cloud?
Where is the cloud? Are we in the cloud now?!”100 To help the
courts comprehend exactly what the cloud is, computer and data
science experts told the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in their
amici briefs that storing data “in the cloud” allows users to access
the data from anywhere in the world, but that the stored
information still has a physical location.101 Further, the amici
contend that network administrators should physically locate the
96
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Id. § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 13 (discussing what Congress needs to
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2014) (No. 13-2814).
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data in the cloud server close to the physical location of the user in
order to enhance network speed and efficiency.102
Due to the nature of cloud storage, the subject of the warrant in
the Microsoft case is likely an Irish citizen; or, in the least,
someone who lives in or spends significant time near Dublin,
Ireland, since the particular emails requested are stored there. For
the U.S. government to take action against this individual, it must
cooperate with the Irish government via its Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”).103 However, because this is an action
against a foreign individual’s data stored on servers owned by a
United States corporation, is the government bypassing
international law by using a SCA warrant?
Irish law requires that the United States seek authorization
from an Irish district court judge in order to obtain the content of
emails from an electronic communications provider.104 The U.S.
government has previously recognized international privacy law
and foreign relations as concerns, even if the prosecutors in this
case have not.105 The Supreme Court has held that there is a
“presumption that United States law governs domestically but does
not rule the world.”106 This presumption would preclude the
Southern District of New York’s view that the SCA silently
authorizes U.S. officials to reach any information abroad that
foreign companies with a U.S. presence can reach from within the
102
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United States.107 Microsoft contends that the district court’s
decision has created international friction that courts are supposed
to avoid by “ensur[ing] that the Judiciary does not erroneously
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy
consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”108
Orin Kerr, professor of law at George Washington University
School of Law and scholar on computer crime law and internet
surveillance, also agrees that the SCA is territorial and should only
apply to domestic issues.109
This argument that the SCA only applies domestically
solidifies that this case is all about location. Is it the location of
Microsoft’s data servers in Dublin that matters (thus making this
an international issue seemingly beyond the SCA), or is it the
location of Microsoft’s headquarters in the United States that
matters (thus making it susceptible to SCA warrants)? The Second
Circuit will have to make this particular distinction in this case,
and the decision is not an easy one. If territoriality is defined by
where the provider is, then the U.S. government’s act is territorial,
as it is obtaining data from a U.S. company operating in the United
States. The location of the data makes no functional difference;
Microsoft can simply obtain the data remotely via a terminal.
Further, because the magistrate judge ruled that ECPA warrants are
hybrids of warrants and subpoenas, it is plausible that all future
ECPA warrants will resemble that of subpoenas.110
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Brief for Appellant, supra note 8 at 19 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013)).
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inside the territory of the U.S., so it makes sense that the SCA does as well.”).
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On the other hand, if territoriality is defined by the location of
the data, then the government’s act is extraterritorial. After all, the
purpose of the statute is to provide privacy protections in the cloud.
If the statute only applies territorially, then it only applies to the
data stored in the cloud on servers in the United States. Whether a
§ 2703(a) warrant is a hybrid subpoena is immaterial; it is a
creature of statute and has the territoriality limits of the statute that
enacted it. Thus, the other plausible holding is that the data
location matters rather than the corporate location. The Second
Circuit must decide whether the location of Microsoft matters and
confirm the district court’s decision, or side with Microsoft and
reverse the decision based on the fact that the data is stored in
Dublin.
B. Implications of a Ruling in Favor of the United States
Either way it rules, the Second Circuit will change the law for
U.S.-based cloud service providers and foreign governments. If
Microsoft loses this case, the court will create precedent allowing
the U.S. government to obtain data stored anywhere in the world
by a U.S. company with just a search warrant. Such policy will be
a major concern for cloud companies that host customer data
outside of the U.S, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of
amici briefs filed on behalf of Microsoft.111
Verizon Communications, Inc. argues in its amici brief that the
decision “could cost U.S. businesses billions of dollars in lost
revenue, undermine international agreements and understandings,
and prompt . . . foreign affiliates of American companies to turn
over the content of customer data stored in the United States.”112
Apple adds that “failure to address issues of international comity,
reciprocity and to properly consider the ramifications of applying
information and does not involve government agents entering the premises of
the ISP to search its servers and seize the e-mail account in question.”).
111
Smith, supra note 11.
112
Brief of Verizon Comm. Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6,
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-2814).
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ECPA extraterritorially, makes it difficult . . . to navigate overlapping
international laws.”113
Foreign nations would likely respond with data segregation
regimes, declaring that all electronic information concerning their
citizens be stored locally, within that nation’s borders. This would
be an astronomical cost to major U.S. corporations like Facebook,
Google, and Apple, which maintain millions of international
customers. The cost of building and maintaining datacenters in
every sovereign nation would also set an incredibly high bar for
entry into the international internet market, limiting the growth of
small companies here in the United States.
NSA dissident Edward Snowden has commented on this case,
echoing similar concerns. In a recent interview he stated that
Microsoft:
. . . matters because if we allow the United States to set the precedent
that national borders don’t matter when it comes to the protection of
people’s information, other countries are watching. They’re paying
attention to our examples and what is normative behavior in terms of
dealing with digital information.114

He further warned:
So the question becomes what does, for example, the government in the
Democratic Republic of Congo or China do the next time they’ve got a
dissident Nobel Peace Prize nominee and they want to read his e-mail,
and it’s in an Irish data center? They’re going to say to Microsoft, “You
handed this stuff over to the DOJ; you’re going to hand the same thing
over to us.”115

In such a scenario, China would levy sanctions against a balking
Microsoft—sanctions that would make Microsoft less competitive
in the Asian market, simultaneously hurting Microsoft and the
American economy.116
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Recall the international effect that the Snowden revelations
already had on the U.S. tech industry.117 A decision for the U.S.
government would most likely exacerbate this international distrust
of American technology, further hindering the U.S. tech industry—
specifically those dealing with cloud technology.
C. Implications of a Ruling in Favor of Microsoft
A decision affirming Microsoft’s position would be a win for
privacy rights and encourage multinational cooperation towards
establishing a new regime of privacy and internet laws. In the
words of Microsoft Vice President and General Counsel Brad
Smith after Ireland filed its amici curiae brief, “The Irish
government’s engagement underscores that an international
dialogue on this issue is not only necessary but possible. We’ve
long argued that it’s best for law enforcement to move forward in a
way that respects people’s rights under their local laws.”118 Indeed,
a Second Circuit finding for Microsoft would force the government
to use the MLAT and cooperate with the Irish, not compel them.
A ruling for Microsoft would show that companies, if not the
individuals, are the owners of their cloud-based information, and
that to get at that information legally the U.S. government must
follow the laws of the other nations involved. This would prevent
reactions such as the law Russia has passed, and promote the
efficient use and growth of the internet.119 This would be a win for
U.S. tech companies that are trying to restore their global
reputation post-Snowden and assure customers that using a U.S.
product is not the same as giving the NSA an open invitation to
peruse their data.120
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If the U.S. government is worried about the speed of criminal
investigation and prosecution—which is exactly what it argued
before the district court and what the district court agreed with—
then it needs to amend the MLAT to provide for expediency.
Otherwise the Department of Justice is single-handedly
determining foreign policy precedent for the United States, which
is something that the State Department and Congress are supposed
to negotiate. In the end, a ruling for Microsoft would put a stop to
the Executive branch’s exploitation of privacy rights and reaffirm
the judiciary’s role in the system of checks and balances.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO RESTORE OVERSIGHT IN U.S.
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
The Microsoft decision should be a catalyst for change as it
brings the overreaching powers of the Executive branch (in the
form of the NSA) into the spotlight. The time is ripe for Congress
or the judiciary to act as a check. As noted above, countries are
already changing privacy and technology policies with regard to
the United States. How should the United States. shape its own
policies going forward: by running roughshod over established
treaties with other sovereign nations, or by stepping back and
reevaluating the protections and policies that should protect the
privacy rights of individuals?
When you give a soldier an order, he or she follows it. In the
outrage over the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States ordered
its security agencies to seek out threats to the United States and its
citizens, giving them sweeping powers in the USA PATRIOT Act.
The NSA should almost be applauded for what it achieved; the
“collect it all” mentality of data interception gave the NSA the
drive to be able to collect the data of nearly any person, whether a
U.S. citizen or foreign national. This collection machine, if it is to
be used to protect the United States and its citizens, must be
regulated.
A. Suggested Revisions to Law: Promoting Congressional
Oversight and Judicial Review

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 197
Railing Against Cyber Imperialism
The ECPA was enacted in 1986 while the Internet was in its
infancy and cloud computing was still on the horizon. Congress, in
enacting the Act, could not have imagined that warrants would
breach international protocol. Quite simply, a procedure used to
fight crime in the United States should not be capable of obtaining
information about foreign citizens of sovereign nations that is
stored extraterritorially. This has the potential to set precedent for
other nations to adopt equivalent procedures, which would
inevitably result international chaos. The ECPA should be
amended with international comity in mind.
Similarly, Orin Kerr asserts that Microsoft all but obligates
Congress to amend the SCA.121 “The statute just wasn’t drafted
with this problem in mind, and Congressional action to create
explicit rules for how the statute applies abroad would be very very
welcome.”122 He posits that, “[i]n a perfect world . . . the statute
would distinguish between people in the U.S. who use U.S.
providers that just happen to store their contents on servers abroad
. . . and people abroad whose providers store e-mails abroad but
also have an office in the U.S.”123 The former would require the
execution of a U.S. warrant, and the latter would require utilization
of the MLATs.124
A proper reform should align the ECPA with the FIPPs,
discussed above.125 Primarily, any amendment should provide for
reasonable notice and control to subjects targeted by SCA
warrants. Currently, individuals targeted by electronic surveillance
are kept unaware by the presence of gag orders silencing their
service providers.126 In addition, warrants are generally sealed,
often indefinitely, with the result that the target is never put on
notice.127
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An amended ECPA should allow for notice to the target of any
electronic surveillance order. Such an amendment could allow for
the sealing of orders for up to six months, with an extension
applicable in extenuating circumstances, but disallow the current
practice of indefinite sealing. Thus targets would be put on notice
of their private data being collected by U.S. authorities, and have
the chance to respond. This change to the law would not only
effectuate transparency in the government, but also allow for
judicial review. Further, government agencies are less likely to
seek warrants wantonly—they would be put on a six-month clock
to make actionable use of the information gathered or their efforts
would be revealed to the subject. This would be a burden for law
enforcement officials, but such should be the cost of policing a free
society.
Coupled with the inability to permanently seal a record would
be the insertion of a private right to action. Just as citizens are
allowed to bring suits against authorities for abuse of power (racial
profiling, etc.), the ECPA should have a provision that allows a
citizen to recover damages for the violation of their privacy rights,
in the form of sanctions against the government, and allowing for
the recovery of attorney’s fees. This too should deter U.S.
authorities from frivolously collecting data about subjects without
a proper cause. Coupled with the notice requirement above, this
would allow for appropriate judicial review of executive action
while still allowing the NSA to do its job; except this time, Big
Brother would also be actively watched.
Lastly, to assuage the U.S. government’s fears that the MLAT
process takes too long, there should be a revision to the MLAT for
expediency in certain situations. For countries that do not have
MLATs with the United States, standard operating procedures and
policies should be put into place that allows for higher-ranking
government officials (at least higher ranking that magistrate
judges) to call upon foreign state departments for aid.
B. Policy Considerations: Privacy Policies Moving Forward
By amending the ECPA to realign with the FIPPs, the United
States would adopt an international policy of comity and
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reciprocity. This is not the only type of policy that is implicated,
however. As noted above, in the United States, the FTC is the
strong arm of privacy law, regulating based on unfair and
deceptive trade practices.128 The FTC holds companies accountable
for the terms and conditions placed within their privacy policies.
Thus, technology companies are also changing their policies to
keep government intrusion out and to protect their users.
Apple, Google, and Facebook have begun encrypting phones,
data centers, and WhatsApp messages, respectively.129 Currently,
companies sidestep the government and avoid producing any
legible documents for review by using data encryption software
that is accessed by a key that only the user possesses.130 This is
good for privacy advocates and bad for people who feel that the
government should have access to that sort of information under
certain circumstances, especially where national security is
concerned. If the Second Circuit rules for the United States, more
companies are likely to adopt policies like these to bypass the
system altogether.131 Ultimately, for criminal investigation purposes,
it might be in the government’s best interest to root for a ruling in
Microsoft’s favor so that fewer tech companies adopt such policies
and access could be granted in some situations. That is to say, if
companies keep encrypting their data with strong algorithms—
which they should—ECPA warrants will only return encrypted
data.
A second policy to consider is users’ terms of service
agreements with tech companies. For example, Microsoft’s terms
of service provide an interesting nuance to the Second Circuit’s
128

See supra Part II.A.
Devlin Barrett et al., Apple and Others Encrypt Phones, Fueling Government
Standoff, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
apple-and-others-encrypt-phones-fueling-government-standoff-1416367801.
130
Id.
131
There is also potential for a third-party privacy company to step in and
encrypt data, which is a growing trend. See, e.g., About Us, F-SECURE CORP,
https://www.f-secure.com/en/web/about_global/about-us (Last visited Jan. 25,
2014) (“We offer millions of people around the globe the power to surf invisibly
and store and share stuff, safe from online threats.”)
129

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 172, 200
Railing Against Cyber Imperialism
deliberations. Microsoft specifies “that different jurisdictions’ laws
apply depending on where in the world the user is located (which
presumably has some correlation with the data location).”132 Thus,
the position that Microsoft takes in the current case conforms to
the business decisions that they have already made about how to
operate as an international corporation.133 Microsoft’s general
counsel, Brad Smith, states in a blog post, “We’ve long argued that
it’s best for law enforcement to move forward in a way that
respects people’s rights under their local laws.”134
Microsoft’s perspective contrasts with similar companies like
Facebook, Twitter, and Google, which “specify that the laws of
their headquarters’ location (California) always apply.”135 This
provides an advantage by “sheltering behind Californian
jurisdiction [to give] the companies the ability to set their own,
US-based [sic] standards for when data should be handed over.
This means that they can provide services internationally, but can
still refuse to hand over data to foreign governments who seek that
data for nefarious purposes.”136 While this gives the Second Circuit
another wrinkle to consider, companies should look closely at their
own terms of service and rule of law clauses. Careful crafting of
these contracts empowers companies to choose the laws that
protect themselves and their users.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Francis chose the correct quote to open his opinion in his
district court ruling: “The rise of an electronic medium that
disregards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by
creating entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject
of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by
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any current territorially based sovereign.”137 His statement
succinctly clarifies the issue faced in the Microsoft case: for the
first time a court is going to have to seriously deliberate where the
boundaries of international jurisdiction apply concerning
information on the internet. “This is something that we need to get
right. The Microsoft case is a wakeup call that the current system
is not doing a good job at serving either the needs of users or the
needs of business.”138
The United States government is unlikely to back down,
trading its access to foreign data for economic growth and
corporate competitiveness. While there are valid arguments for
swiftly acting for law enforcement purposes, the judiciary should
rule for Microsoft to preserve international civility and allow the
U.S. tech sector to begin regaining trust across the globe. As
Facebook’s Director of Public Policy Sarah Wynn-Williams stated
in the fall of 2014, “. . . the bottom line is, people won’t use
technology they don’t trust.”139
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